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Abst rac t - - ln  this paper, we introduce and study a new class of constrained multiobjective games 
in general noncompact topological space. By employing an existence theorem of quasi-equilibrium 
problems due to this author, several existence theorems of weighted Nash equilibria and Pareto 
equilibria for the constrained multiobjective games are established in noncompact topological spaces. 
These theorems improve, unify, and generalize the corresponding results of the multiobjective games 
in recent literature. (~) 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of an equilibrium point for an n-person game was first introduced by Nash [1,2], 
who established the existence of the equilibrium point under certain assumptions. Since then, 
the Nash equilibrium problem for n-person games have been intensively studied and extended by 
a number of authors under various assumptions and different directions. The constrained games 
with finite or infinite players is an important generalization of n-person games which have been 
widely studied by many authors. 
Recently, much attention has been focused on the game problems with vector payoffs in game 
theory, for example, see [3-13] and the references therein. One of the reasons is that multicriteria 
models can be better applied to real-world situations. The motivation for the study of multi- 
criteria models can be found in [3-5]. The existence of Pareto equilibria is one of fundamental 
problems. In order to guarantee the existence of Pareto equilibria of the multiobjective games 
without constraints, ome sufficient conditions have been given by several authors, for example, 
see [9-13]. 
In this paper, we introduce a new class of multiobjective games with constrained correspon- 
dences in general topological space. By employing an existence theorem of quasi-equilibrium 
problems due to this author [14], several existence theorems of weighted Nash equilibria and 
Pareto equilibria for the constrained multiobjective games are established in noncompact topo- 
logical spaces. These theorems improve, unify, and generalize the corresponding existence results 
of Pareto equilibria for the multiobjective games in recent literature. 
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2. PREL IMINARIES  
For a set X, we shall denote by 2 X and ~'(X) the family of all subsets of X and the family 
of all nonempty finite subset of X, respectively. A subset B of a topological space X is said to 
be compactly open (respectively, compactly closed) in X if for any nonempty compact subset K 
of X, B N K is open (respectively, closed) in K. A topological space is said to be contractible if
the identity mapping Ix  on X is homotopic to a constant function. 
Let N = {1, 2 , . . . ,  n} and X ~ be a topological space for each i E N. We shall use the following 
notations: 
X = 1-I Xi  and X i= YI XJ" 
iEN jEN, j#i 
For each x E X, x ~ denotes its ith coordinate and x ~ the projection ofx on X ~. Write x = (xi,x~). 
In this paper, we shall consider a constrained game with finite-players and multicriteria in its 
strategic form F = (X~,A~,Fi)~eN. For each player i E N, X i is its strategy set, A i : X i ---* 2 x '  
is its constrained correspondence which restricts the strategies of the ira player to the subset 
Ai(x ~) C X ~ when all the other players have chosen their strategies xJ • X j, j ~ i, and 
F ~ = (f~, f~, . . . ,  f~)  : X -~ R k' is its payoff function (or say, loss function or multicriteria), 
where k~ is a positive integer. In such a constrained multiobjective game, the other players 
influence player j • N, 
(a) indirectly, by restricting j 's feasible strategies to A j (x 3), 
(b) directly, by affecting j 's  payoff function F i. 
If a strategy x = (x 1, x2, . . . ,  x ~) • X is played, each player i is trying to minimize her/his payoff 
function Fi(x) = (f{(x), f~(x), . . . ,  f~, (x)), which consists of noncommensurable outcomes. Each 
player i has a preference ~-i over the outcome space Rk,. For each player i • N, its preference __i 
is given as 
z l~ iz  2, if and only i fz J>_z 2, V j= l ,2 , . . . , k i ,  
-~- " '  = (Z I '  Z2 ' ' ' ' '  kl) are any elements in R k' The players' where z I (z~,z~,.. z~,) and z 2 2  z 2 
preference relations induce the preference on X, defined for each player i, and chooses x = 
(X 1, X2, . . . , X n) and y = (yl, y2, . . . ,  y,~) by 
x __-i Y, whenever Fi(x) ~i Fi(Y). 
In the constrained multiobjective game, each player i • N is trying to minimize her/his own 
payoff according to her/his preferences. 
If A(x ~) = X ~ for each i E N and for all x i • X i, then the model of constrained multiobjective 
games reduces to the model of multicriteria games G = (X i, Fi)~eg studied by Wang [9,10], 
Ding [11], Yuan and Warafdar [12], and Yu and Yuan [13]. If for each player i • N, F'(x) = fi(x), 
i.e., ki = 1, which consists of commensurable outcomes, then the model of the constrained 
multiobjective games reduces to the model of the constrained games (or say, metagames) tudied 
by Aubin [15, p. 282-283], Aubin and Ekeland [16, p. 350-351], Ding [17,18], Tian [19], and Yuan, 
Isac, Tan and Yu [20]. 
For the games with vector payoff functions (or say, multicriteria), it is well known that, in 
general, there does not exist a strategy & E X to minimize (or equivalently to say, maximize) all 
f~s for each player i • N, for example, see [7]. Hence, we need to give some concepts of solutions 
of the constrained multiobjective games. Throughout his paper, for each given m E N, we shall 
denote by R~ the nonnegative orthant of R m, i.e., 
R~ = {u= ( .ul ,u2,. . . ,u m) • Rm:  u j _> 0, Vj = 1 ,2 , . . .m},  
so that the nonnegative orthant R~ of R m has a nonempty interior with the topology induced 
in terms of convergence of vectors with respect o the Euclidean metric. That is, 
[ R~ ~-- {is = (ul,u2,...,?~ rn) • am:  ?~J > O, Vj  --~ 1,2 , . . . ,m}.  
J 
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We denote by T m and int T~ the simplex of R~ and its relative interior, respectively, i.e., + 
r m= (u 1,u 2, . ,u  m) •R m , + U~ .. +: Uj=I 
j=l 
/T2  = {//,~-- (ul,u2,...,?~ rn) • 
Now we have the following definitions. 
m} 
/R~:~u j= l  . 
j=l  
DEFINITION 2.1. A strategy ~ • X i o[ player i is said to be a Pareto efficient strategy (re- 
spectively, a weak Pareto efficient strategy) with respect o d: • X if Y: i • A(~ i) and there is no 
strategy xi • A(~: ~) such that 
P F • \ {o}, 
DEFINITION 2.2. A strategy ~ E X is said to be a Pareto equilibrium (respectively, a weak Pareto 
equilibrium) of the constrained multiob jective game F = ( X i, A i, Fi ) ie N if, for each player i • N, 
~i • Ai(~) is a Pareto efficient strategy (respectively, a weak Pareto efficient strategy) with 
respect o ~. 
From the above definitions, it is clear that each Pareto equilibrium is a weak Pareto equilibrium, 
but the converse is not always true. We also need the following definition. The idea is from that 
of Wang [9,10]. 
DEFINITION 2.3. A strategy d~ • X is said to be a weighted Nash equilibrium with respect 
to the weighted vector W = (W1,W2, . . . ,W n) of a constrained multiobjective game F = 
(X i ,A i ,  F i ) iey if for each player i • N, we have 
(1) a~ i • Ai(2i), 
(2) w • \ {0}, 
(3) W ~ • P(:~) < W i .  P (x i ,~ i ) ,  Vx i • Ai(~ i) where • denotes the inner product in R k'. 
REMARK 2.1. In particular, if W i • T+ k~ for each i • N, then the strategy ~ • X is said to 
be a normalized weighted Nash equilibrium with respect o W. From the definitions above, it is 
not difficult to verify that a strategy a~ • X is a weighted Nash equilibrium with respect o the 
weighted vector W = (W 1, W~,. . . ,  W '~) of the game F = (X i, A i, P) ieg  if and only if ~ • X 
is an optimal solution of the constrained optimization problem: find ~ • X such that for each 
i •N ,  
:P E A~ (:~i) , 
W i .F  i(d:) = min W':. F i (x i ,~) .  
In order to show the main results, we need the following existence result of quasi-equilibrium 
problems which is the Corollary 2.1 of [14]. 
LEMMA 2.1. Let X be a topological space, K be a nonempty compact subset of X,  A : X --* 2 x 
be a set-valued mapping with nonempty values, and ¢ : X x X --* RU {+cx)} be a function such 
that we have the following. 
(i) For each y E X,  A- l (y)  is compactly open in X.  
(ii) The set D = {x E X : x E A(x)} is compactly dosed in X.  
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(iii) The function x ~-* ¢(x, x) is lower semicontinuous on each compact subset of X and for 
each x 6 X ,  y ~ ¢(x, y) is upper semicontinuous on each compact subset of X .  
(iv) For each B e J:(X), there exists a nonempty compact contractible subset LB of X con- 
taining B such that for each compactly open subset U of X ,  the set 
is empty or contractible and for each z E LB \ K, if x ~ D, then A(x) M LB ¢ ~; if x 6 D, 
then A(x) M P(x) M LB ~ O, where P(x) = {y E X :  ¢(x, x) - ¢(y, x) > 0}. Then there 
exists a ~ 6 X such that 
E A (2), 
¢ (2,/:) _< ¢(y, 2), V y E A (~). 
3. EXISTENCE OF WEIGHTED NASH EQUILIBRIUM 
In this section, we shall show some existence theorems of the weighted Nash equilibrium for 
the constrained multiobjective game. 
THEOREM 3.1. Let F = (X  i, A i, Fi)iEN be a constrained multiobjective game where each X ~ is 
a topoiogical space, A ~ : X i ~ 2 x~ is the constrained correspondence, and F ~ = (f{, f~ . . . .  , f~)  : 
X ~ R k~ is the payoff function for each player i E N. For each i E N,  let K ~ be a nonempty 
compact subset of X i and K = L ieN Ki" Suppose that there exists a weighted vector W = 
(W 1, W2, . . . ,  W n) with W i E R k~ \ {0} such that the following conditions are satisfied. 
(i) For each i E N, A ~ has nonempty values such that for each yi E X i, (A~)-l(y ~) in 
compactly open in X ~ and the set D = {x E X : x E A(x)} is compactly closed in X 
where A(x) = I~iEN Ai(x~) for each x e X .  
(ii) The function ¢ : X x X --~ R defined by ¢(y,x) = E ieN Wi  . F' (y i ,x i )  satisfies that 
x ~-* ~b(x, x) is lower semicontinuous on each compact subset of X and for each fixed 
x 6 X, y ~ ¢(x, y) is upper semicontinuous on each compact subset of X .  
(iii) For each B 6 9~(X), there exists a nonempty compact contractible subset LB of X con- 
taining B such that for each compactly open subset U of X ,  the set 
is empty or contractible and for each x E LB \ K, if x ~ D, then A(x) M LB # @; if x 6 D, 
then A(x) n P(x) n LB # O, where P(x) = {y E X : ~(x, x) - ¢(y, x) > 0}. Then r has at 
least one weighted Nash equilibrium point :~ E X with respect o the weighted vector W. 
PROOF. Let X = I l ieg  Xi be the product opological space. Clearly, K is a nonempty compact 
subset of X. By Condition (i), we have that for each x E X ,  A(x) = l-Leg A~(x~), 
A-X(y) = {x 6 X : y E A(x)} 
= {xeX 
;N(x 
i EN  
x (A') -1 (vi)) 
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is compactly open in X. Hence, Condition (i) of Lemma 2.1 is satisfied. By Conditions (i)-(iii), 
it is easy to see that A and ¢ satisfy all conditions of Lemma 2.1. Hence, there exists a ~ • X 
such that ~ • A(~) and 




For each i E N and for any given y~ E Ai(~i), let y = (yt, ~) ,  then we have that y E A(~), and it 
follows from (3.1) that W i. Ft(~) <_ W t. Ft(y t, ~)  for all yi E At(~). This proves that for each 
i EN ,  
~iEA i (~ i )  and W t .F  t (~)= rain W t F t yIEA~(/:~) ' (yi,:~i) 
i.e., ~ E X is a weighted Nash equilibrium point of F with respect o the weighted vector W. 
REMARK 3.1. If for each i E N, X i is a compact contractible space. Then letting K t = X i 
for each i E N and LB = X = YIiey Xt for each B E ~'(X), Condition (iii) of Theorem 3.1 is 
satisfied trivially. 
THEOREM 3.2. Let F = (X  i, F i ) tey be a multiobjective game where each X t is a topological 
space and F i = (f~,f~,. . .  ,f~,) : X --* R k' is the payoff unction of i th player. For each i E N, 
let K i be a nonempty compact subset of X t and K = 1-Leg Kt. Suppose that there exists a 
weighted vector W = (W 1, W2,.  . . , W n) with W ~ 6 R ki \ {0} such that the following conditions 
are satisfied. 
(i) The function ~b : X x X ~ R defined by !b(y,x) = ~teN W I • Ft (yt ,x  i) is such that 
x ~-~ ¢(x, x) is lower semicontinuous on each compact subset of X and for each fixed 
x 6 X ,  y ~-~ ¢(y, x) is upper semicontinuous on each compact subset of X .  
(ii) For each B E 9v(X), there exists a nonempty compact contractible subset Ls  of X contain- 
ing B such that for each compact open subset U of X ,  the set Mzev(A(x) A Ls )  is empty 
or contractible and for each x E LB \ K, there exists a y 6 LB satisfying ~b(y, x) < ~b(x, x). 
Then F has at least one weighted Nash equilibrium point ~ E X with respect o the weighted 
vector W. 
PROOF. For each i E N and for all x ~ E X ~, let At(x ~) = X t, then it is easy to see that the 
conclusion of Theorem 3.2 follows from Theorem 3.1. 
COROLLARY 3.1. Let F = (X i ,A i ,F i ) iey  be a constrained multiobjective game where X i is 
a nonempty convex subset of a topological vector space, A t : X i -~ 2 z~ is the constrained 
correspondence, and F i = (f~,f~,. . .  ,f~,) : X ~ R k~ is the payoff function for each i E N. For 
each i E N, let K t be a nonempty compact subset of X t and K = 1-Leg Kt. Suppose that there 
exists a weighted vector W = (WI ,W2, . . . ,W n) with W i E R k~ \ {0} for each i 6 N such that 
the following conditions are satisfied. 
(i) For each i E N, A i has nonempty convex values and t:or each yi E X i, (A i ) - l (y  i) is 
compactly open in X ~, and the set D = {x 6 X : x E A(x)} is compactly dosed in X ,  
where A(x) = HieN Ai(x~) for each x E X. 
(ii) Condition (ii) of Theorem 3.1 holds. 
(iii) For each x E X ,  the function y ~-* !b(y, x) is quasiconvex. 
(iv) For each B 6 ~'(X), there exists a compact convex subset Ls  of X containing B such that 
for each x 6 LB \ K, if x ¢ D, then A(x) n LB 7 £ 0; if x E D, then A(x) N Ls N P(x) # @ 
where P(x) = {y e X : ¢(x, x) - ~b(y, x) > O}/or each x • X. 
Then F has at least an weighted Nash equilibrium point with respect to the weighted vector W.  
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PROOF. By Condition (iii), for each x E X ,  P(x) is convex. It follows that for each B E ~'(X) 
and for each compactly open subset U of X, the set 
is empty or convex, and hence, it is empty or contractible. It is easy to see that the conclusion 
of Corollary 3.1 follows from Theorem 3.1. 
COROLLARY 3.2. Let F = (X  ~, F i ) ieg be a multiobjective game, where X i is a nonempty convex 
subset of a topological vector space and F ~ = (f~, f~, . . . ,  f~)  : X --* R k' is the payoff unction of 
i th player for each i E N. For each i E N, let Ki be a nonempty compact (not necessarily convex) 
subset and K --- [LeN Ki. Suppose that there exists a weighted vector W -- (W 1, W2, . . . ,  W n) 
with W i E R k~ \ {0} for each i E N such that we have the following. 
^ 
(i) The function ¢ : X x X ---* R defined by ¢(y,x)  = ~':~ieN Wi  " Fi(Yi, xi) satisfies that 
x ~ f(x,  x) is lower semicontinuous on each compact subset of X and for each fixed 
x E X ,  y ~-* f (x ,  y) is upper semicontinuous on each compact subset of X .  
(ii) The function y ~ ¢(y, x) is quasiconvex. 
(iii) For each B E Y (X) ,  there exists a compact convex subset LB of X containing B such 
that for each x E LB \ K, there exists a y E LB satisfying ¢(y,x) < ¢(x,x). 
Then F has at least a weighted Nash equilibrium point with respect o the weighted vector W. 
PROOF. For each i E N and for all x ~ E X i, let Ai(x ~) = X ~, then the conclusion of CoroUary 3.2 
holds from Corollary 3.1. 
REMARK 3.2. If Condition (iii) of Corollary 3.2 is replaced by the following condition 
(iii) ~ There exists a nonempty compact convex subset X0 of X such that for each x E X \ K, 
there exists y E co (X0 U (x}) such that 
iEN iEN 
Then the conclusion of Corollary 3.2 still holds. Now we show that Condition (iii)' implies 
Condition (iii). For each B E ~-(X), let Ls  = co (X0 A N), then LB is a compact convex 
subset of X containing B. For each x E LB \K ,  we have co(X0U {x}) C LB and there 
exists y E co (X0 U {x}) C LB such that ¢(y, x) < ¢(x, x) by Condition (iii) t, where ~(y, x) = 
~-~ieN Wi  " Fi(Y i, x~) • Hence, (iii) I =~ (iii). Therefore, Corollary 3.2 improves and generalizes 
Theorem 1 of [12], Theorem 2 of [13], Theorem 3.1 of [10], Theorem 1.11 of [3], and Theorem 1 
of [6] in several aspects. Theorem 3.1 further unifies and generalizes the above results to the 
constrained multiobjective game and general noncompact topological space. 
4. EXISTENCE OF PARETO EQUILIBRIUM 
In this section, we shall employ the existence result of the weighted Nash equilibrium in the 
above section to deduce some existence results of Pareto equilibrium for constrained multiob- 
jective games. In order to do so, we first need the following lemma which tells us that the 
existence problems of Pareto equilibrium for constrained multiobjective games can be reduced to 
the existence of the weighted Nash equilibrium under certain circumstances. 
LEMMA 4.1. Each normalized weighted Nash equilibrium ~ E X with respect to a weight W = 
• , n T k' (respectively, W E 1-LeN f T~ ~) for a constrained multiobjective (W 1,w2,.. W n) E I I i EN  + 
game F = (X  i, A ~, Fi)iEN is a weak Pareto equilibrium (respectively, a Pareto equilibrium) of 
the game F. 
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PROOF. Noting the definitions of weighted Nash equilibrium and Pareto equilibrium for the 
constrained multiobjective games, by using similar argument as in the proof of Lemma 2.1 of [10, 
pp. 376-377], it is easy to show that the conclusion of Lemma 4.1 holds, and hence, we omit it. 
REMARK 4.1. We should note that the conclusion of Lemma 4.1 still holds if 5: E X is a weighted 
Nash equilibrium with a weight W E l-lieN R~_' \ {0} (respectively, W E 1-IieN f R~_') of the 
game F. It should be also pointed out that a Pareto equilibrium of F is not necessarily a weighted 
Nash equilibrium of the game P. 
THEOREM 4.1. Let F = ( Xi ,  A i, Fi)ieN be a constrained multiobjective game where each X i is a 
topological space and A i : X ~ ~ 2 x" is the constrained correspondence and F ~ = ( f~ , f~, . . . , f~,) : 
X ---* R k' is the loss function for each player i E N. For each i E N, let K i be a nonempty 
compact subset of X ~ and let K = [-[iel Ki" Suppose that there exists a weighted vector W = 
(W 1, W2, ., W n) with W ~ E R k~ \ {0} for each i E N such that Conditions (i)-(iii) of Theorem 3.1 
are satisfied. Then F has at least a weak Pareto equilibrium point in X .  In addition, if W = 
(W 1, W2,.  . . , W n) E 1-LeN f T~ ~, then F has at/east a Pareto equilibrium point in X .  
PROOF. By Theorem 3.1, P has at least a weighted Nash equilibrium point 5: E X with respect 
to the weighted vector W. Lemma 4.1 shows that 5: is also a weak Pareto equilibrium point of F, 
and a Pareto equilibrium point of P if W E f T+ k~. 
THEOREM 4.2. Let P = (X  ~, F i ) ieg be a multiobjective game where each X i is a topological 
space and F i = (f~, f~, . . . ,  f~,) : X --* R k~ is the payoff unction of ith player. For each i E N, 
let Ki be a nonempty compact subset of X and K = YIieg Ki. Suppose that there exists a 
weighted vector W ~- (W 1, W2, . . . ,  W n) with W i E R k~ \ {0) such that Conditions (i) and (ii) of 
Theorem 3.2 hold. Then the multiobjective game F has at least a weak Pareto equilibrium point 
in X .  In addition, if W E I-Leg f T~ ~ , then F has at least a Pareto equilibrium point in X .  
PROOF. By Theorem 3.2, F has at least a weighted Nash equilibrium point 5: E X with respect 
to the weighted vector W. By Lemma 4.1, 5: is also a weak Pareto equilibrium point of F, and a 
Pareto equilibrium point of F if W E I-lieN f T+ k~. 
As immediate consequences of Theorem 4.1, we can easily obtain the following results. 
COROLLARY 4.1. Let F = (X i, A i, Fi)ieN be a constrained multiobjective game. For each player 
i E N,  its strategyset X i is a nonempty convex subset of a topological vector space, A i : X ~ ~ 2 x~ 
is its constrained correspondence and F ~ = (f~, f~, . . . ,  f~,) : X --* R k' is its payoff function. 
Suppose that there exists a weighted vector W = (W 1, W2, . . . , W n) E l-Iieg Rk' \ {0) such that 
Conditions (i)-(iv) of Corollary 3.1 holds. Then F has at/east a weak Pareto equilibrium point 
5: E X. Furthermore, f fW E ~eN f Tk+ ~, then F has at least a Pareto equilibrium point. 
PROOF. By Corollary 3.1, F has at least a weighted Nash equilibrium point 5: E X with respect 
to the weighted vector W. Now Lemma 4.1 implies that 5: is also a weak Pareto equilibrium point 
of F, and a Pareto equilibrium point of F if W E I-LEN f T~ -'" 
REMARK 4.1. Corollary 4.1 generalizes Theorem 2 of [12], Theorem 4 of [13], and Theorem 3.2 
of [10] to constrained multiobjective games under much weaker assumptions. 
COROLLARY 4.2. Let F = (Xi,  A i ,F i ) ieg  be a constrained multiobjective game. For each 
player i E N,  its strategy set X i is a nonempty convex subset of a topological vector space, 
A i :X  ~ ---* 2 x'  is its constrained correspondence and F i = ( f~, f~, . . . , f~, )  :X  --~ R k' is 
its payoff function. Suppose that for each i E N and for each j = 1,2, . . .  ,ki, the following 
conditions are satisfied. 
(i) A i has nonempty convex values and for each yi E X i, (Ai)- l(y i) is compactly open in X i 
and the set  NieN{X e X : 3g i E Ai(xi)} is compactly closed in X where X -- ['IieN Xi. 
(ii) f~ is jointly lower semicontinuous on each compact subset of X and for each yi E X ~, the 
function x i ,-~ f~(yi,xi) is upper semicontinuous on each compact subset of X i. 
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(iii) For each fixed x ~ E X i, the function yi ~_. f~(yi, x i) is convex. 
(iv) There exists a nonempty compact convex subset X~ of X ~ and a nonempty compact (not 
necessarily convex) subset K s of  X i such that  for each x E X \  K ,  there is a y E co (XoU{x}) 
such that f j (x ' ,x  > f j (v ' ,x  for ail i e N j = 1, . . . ,  k, where Xo = 1-I, N 
K = I l ieN Ki" 
Then the constrained multiobjective game F has at least a Pareto equilibrium point & E X .  
PROOF. Take any fixed weighted vector W = (W 1, W2, .  .. , W n) E ~Iien f Tk' '  From Condi- 
t ions ( i ) -( iv)  and Remark  3.2, it is easy to check that  all condit ions of Corol lary 3.2 are satisfied. 
Thus, F has at least a weighted Nash equil ibrium point & E X with respect o the weighted vector 
W.  As W E YIiEN f Tki' by Lemma 4.1, & must be a Pareto equi l ibr ium point of the constrained 
mult iobject ive game F. This completes the proof. 
REMARK 4.2. Corol lary 4.2 generalizes Theorem 3 of [12], Theorem 6 of [13], and Theorem 3.2 
of [10] to constrained mult iobject ive games, and hence, Theorem 4.1 further unifies and generalizes 
the above results to noncompact  constrained mult iobject ive games and to general noncompact  
topological  space. 
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